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I.  INTRODUCTION
Suppose  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  were  simply  ripped  out  of  the
Constitution.  What  would change  in contemporary  constitutional  law?
Justice  Kennedy  has  written,  "[t]he  Free  Exercise  Clause  embraces  a
freedom of conscience  and worship that has close  parallels in  the speech
provisions  of  the  First  Amendment  ....  2  The  parallels  may  be  so
close that the  lines actually  coincide.  The  reasons  for  the near-identity
of the protection  afforded by the  Free Exercise  Clause and that afforded
by  other  constitutional  provisions  are  founded  in  two  doctrinal
developments. 3  First, although the Free  Exercise  Clause  could  be,  and
*  Carmack  Waterhouse  Professor of Constitutional  Law, Georgetown  University Law  Center.
I would  like  to thank Kevin  Quinn, S.J.,  for his  assistance in locating material  on Roman  Catholic
moral  teaching,  Andrew  Koppleman,  Eugene  Volokh,  and  participants  at  a  Faculty  Research
Workshop  at  Georgetown  University Law  Center  for  helpful  comments.  I regret  that personal
considerations  made it impossible  for me  to attend,  and therefore  to profit from the discussions  at,
the  Loyola University  Chicago  School of  Law  Conference  on Law  and Religion  for  which  this
Article was prepared.
1. I put the question this way  so that I can concede the importance of the Free  Exercise Clause
in the history of free  expression  law.  See Capitol Square Review  & Advisory  Bd.  v.  Pinette,  515
U.S.  753  (1995).  "[I]n  Anglo-American  history ....  government  suppression  of speech  has so
commonly  been  directed precisely at  religious  speech that  a  free-speech  clause  without religion
would  be Hamlet  without the prince."  Id. at 760.  I am  interested  not  in  what the Free  Exercise
Clause  has  contributed  to  the  development  of  civil  liberty,  but  what  the  contemporary  Free
Exercise  Clause adds to our civil liberties.
2.  Lee  v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,  591  (1992).
3.  A  note on  the  nature  of my  enterprise  seems  appropriate.  In  what  follows,  I offer  what  I
believe  to be  the most  natural  readings  of the relevant cases.  I acknowledge  that  there are other
plausible  readings,  some  of  which  would  provide  distinctive  protection  to  religious  liberty
through  the  Free  Exercise  Clause.  See, e.g., infra note 82  and  accompanying  text  (describing  a
more  aggressive  reading of the protection  afforded  by  the Free Exercise  Clause when  state laws
are not  "generally  applicable");  see also Michael  W.  McConnell,  The  Problem of Singling Out
Religion, 50  DEPAUL L.  REV.  1, 3  (2000)  (noting  that exceptions  articulated  in  Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources  v.  Smith,  494  U.S.  872  (1990),  "if  generously
interpreted,  could prove to be  a substantial  exception"  to the case's central holding).  My sense is
that those who  offer these  alternative case  readings  do so  because  they  disagree  with the cases'
natural  reading  and  believe  that the  Free  Exercise  Clause  ought  to give  religious  liberty  more
protection than the Supreme Court appears to believe  it should.Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
has  been,  interpreted differently  in  the past, today  the  Clause  protects
only  against statutes  that target religious  practice for regulation.  Under
the notorious  peyote case,  Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith,4  the Clause does not  require states  to accommodate
their neutral  statutes of general applicability  to religious  practices.5  The
present scope of the Free Exercise Clause, that is, is quite small.6
Second,  other constitutional  doctrines protect a wide range of actions
in  which  religious  believers  engage.  Much  religious  activity  is  speech,
pure  and  simple,  and  therefore  protected  by  the  Free  Speech  Clause.
The  free  speech  doctrine  includes  a  non-discrimination  requirement,
which  the Supreme Court has  invoked with respect to  religious speech.7
Many  regulations  singling  out  religious  speech  for  adverse  treatment
fall  under the non-discrimination  requirement.  Further,  much religious
activity,  while  not  conducted  in  words,  may  fairly  be  described  as
symbolic  speech, triggering  free  speech  protection.  In  addition,  some
aspects  of religious practice not covered by free  speech principles might
be protected by  a constitutional  right of intimate association.  Finally, a
newly  emerging  doctrine  defining  a  right  of expressive  association
could  provide  substantial  protection  for  the  internal  activities  of
religious  organizations,  where  those  activities  are  in  some  sense
constitutive  of  the  religious  community  itself.8  Thus,  the  protection
afforded  the exercise  of religion  by clauses other than the Free Exercise
Clause is relatively  large.9
4.  Employment  Div., Dep't of Human Res. v.  Smith, 494 U.S.  872 (1990).
5.  See  infra note  29  and  accompanying  text  (discussing  the  neutrality  and  generality
requirements  of enforceable  laws).
6.  Of  course  my  argument  would  fail  if  the  Clause's  scope  expanded,  for  example  by  a
judicial repudiation of the peyote case.
7.  Rosenberger  v.  Rectors & Visitors of Univ.  of Va.,  515  U.S.  819, 829  (1995)  (holding  that
a university  regulation  prohibiting  the use of funds for student religious organizations  was  a form
of viewpoint discrimination,  violating the First Amendment).
8.  See  infra Part  III  (arguing  that  the  Free  Speech  Clause  in  combination  with  the  Free
Exercise Clause  would protect religious practice  left unprotected  after the peyote case).
9.  Steven Gey has  recently argued  that governments  may invoke the Establishment  Clause to
justify  restrictions  on  religious  expression  that  would  not be  allowed  were  the  government
invoking  its general  police powers  to  restrict non-religious  expression.  Steven  G. Gey,  When  Is
Religious Speech Not "Free Speech"?, 2000  U.  ILL.  L.  REV.  379, 400 (2000).  I do not address
Gey's argument in this Article  because  my concern  is with what might be called  the coverage of
religious  expression-whether  it  would  have  special  constitutional  weight  absent  the  Free
Exercise  Clause-and  not  with the  question  of the circumstances  in which  limitations  on  such
expression  might be justified.  In my terms,  the title of Professor Gey's article is a bit misleading
because the article  does not address  the2  question of "When  is religious  speech not 'free  speech'?,"
but  rather  the  question,  "When  is  religious  speech  permissibly  subject  to  regulation  in
circumstances where secular speech would not be subject to regulation?."
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Together  these  observations  suggest  my  conclusion:  Contemporary
constitutional  doctrine  may  render  the  Free  Exercise  Clause
redundant. 10
II.  RELIGIOUS  EXPRESSION  AS SPEECH
According  to the  Supreme  Court, "private  religious  speech..,  is  as
fully  protected  under  the  Free  Speech  Clause  as  secular  private
expression."'1   We  must,  of course,  have  in  hand  an  analysis  of free
speech  law  before  we  can  analyze  the  extent  to  which  religious
activities  are  "fully  protected  under  the  Free  Speech  Clause."  Today
there  are  two available structures for free  speech  analysis. 12  These two
structures  sometimes  yield  different  results,  and  make  sense  of sets  of
Supreme  Court  decisions  that differ  slightly.  As  I will  argue,  they do
10.  According to  some approaches  to constitutional  interpretation,  that conclusion  is  a reason
to  reject contemporary  constitutional  doctrine.  Such approaches  insist that every  constitutional
provision have  some independent  meaning.  See,  e.g.,  United States  v.  Lopez, 514  U.S.  549,  588
(1995)  (Thomas, J.,  concurring).  In Lopez, Justice Thomas  argues against  the view that  Congress
has the power to regulate activities  that affect interstate commerce because if it did,
many  of Congress'  other  enumerated  powers  under  Art.  I, §  8,  [would  be]  wholly
superfluous.  After  all,  if Congress  may  regulate  all  matters  that  substantially  affect
commerce,  there  is  no  need  for  the Constitution  to  specify  that Congress  may  enact
bankruptcy  laws, cl.  4, or coin money  and fix  the standard of weights  and measures,  cl.
5,  or  punish  counterfeiters  of United  States  coin  and  securities,  cl.  6.  Likewise,
Congress would  not need  the separate  authority to establish  post offices and post roads,
cl.  7,  or  to  grant  patents  and copyrights,  cl.  8,  or  to  "punish  Piracies  and  Felonies
committed on the high Seas,"  cl.  10.
Id.
Frederick  Mark Gedicks  defends  a  position similar to the one developed  here.  Frederick Mark
Gedicks,  Towards  a  Defensible  Free Exercise Doctrine, GEO.  WASH.  L.  REV.  (forthcoming
2001).  Professor  Gedicks argues that free  speech and  related doctrines  should  be developed  in
ways  that  acknowledge  the  presence  of  a  religious  interest.  This, Professor  Gedicks  argues,
would avoid  making the Free  Exercise  Clause redundant.  I am  not sure  that  it would.  Professor
Gedicks argues,  for example, that religious  expression  should be treated  as  a form of  high-value
speech,  but  I doubt  that  doing  so  requires  that  we  treat  the  fact  that  speech  is  religious  as
something that changes the application  of standards  for determining  when speech  is high-value.
For a discussion  of the question  of whether religious  speech  is high-value speech,  see  infra notes
32-35 and accompanying  text.
11.  Capitol  Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,  515 U.S.  753, 760 (1995).
12.  In  this  Article,  I do  not  address  the  distinctive  problem  of government  speech.  In  my
view,  questions  about  government  speech  present  problems  with  respect  to  the  government's
general  police  powers  and  with  respect  to  the  Establishment  Clause.  I do  not think  that,  on
careful  analysis,  questions  about  the  permissibility  of speech  by  government  officials  in  their
official capacity  are  fruitfully addressed  in  free exercise  terms.  See Gey,  supra note  9,  at  392
(concluding  that non-policy making  public employees  "receive  some  free  speech protection for
their purely  private  religious  expression"  but  only  up  to the  point that  their expression  is  not
logically "attributable to the government").74  Loyola University Chicago Law Journal  [Vol.  33
not differ substantially with respect  to those  religious activities that can
fairly be characterized  as speech or symbolic speech. 13
A.  Direct  Regulation of Religious Activities as Free Speech
The easier  model to describe divides  all  expressive activities  into two
categories,  one category receiving full protection  and the other receiving
no protection.  Byfull  protection,  I mean that state efforts to regulate the
activity  must satisfy  a high  standard. 14  By  no protection,  I  mean,  as a
preliminary  statement,  that  rational  state  efforts  to  regulate  will  be
permitted.  Chaplinsky  v.  New  Hampshire 15  provides  a  convenient
statement of this model:
There  are certain well-defined  and  narrowly limited classes  of speech,
the  prevention  and  punishment  of which  has  never  been  thought  to
raise  any  Constitutional  problem.  These  include  the  lewd  and
obscene,  the  profane,  the  libelous,  and  the  insulting  or  'fighting'
words  ....  16
Expression  "inside"  the  scope  of  the  First  Amendment  is  fully
protected;  expression  "outside"  it  is  not.  What  about  religious
expression?
Governments  can  regulate  expression  directly  or indirectly.  Direct
regulation  consists  of  rules  prohibiting  the  expression.  Indirect
regulation  raises  the  costs  of  expression  in  some  other  way,  for
example,  by denying  the expression  some  benefit, like access  to public
space  available  to  other  forms  of expression.  The  peyote  case  used
these terms  to describe  direct  regulation:  A direct  regulation  "requires
(or forbids)  the performance  of an  act that  [a person's]  religious belief
forbids (or requires)."' 1 7  Direct regulation  is  impermissible if the act in
question  is  belief  or  the  profession  of  belief, for  both  are  forms  of
speech,  pure  and  simple.  Coerced  speech  cases  such  as  Wooley  v.
Maynard' 8 make obvious this point.
13.  I do  not  purport  to deal  comprehensively  in  this  Article  with  all  problems  of religious
exercise.  My  defense is  that  I do cover  a  great deal  of the relevant  territory.  The  scope  of a
distinctive  free exercise protection  would be small even  if, as  I doubt,  such distinctive protection
were needed for every problem I fail to discuss.
14.  Depending on the context, this standard might be described as strict scrutiny  or as the clear
and  present  danger  test  or  some  variant  adapted  to  the  particular  problem  at  hand.  I  do  not
believe that anything significant turns on the standard's precise formulation.
15.  Chaplinsky  v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.  568 (1942).
16.  Id. at 571-72 (citations omitted).
17.  Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v.  Smith, 494  U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
18.  Wooley  v. Maynard, 430  U.S. 705, 714-17  (1977)  (holding  that a  state may not require an
individual  to disseminate  an  ideology  by requiring  the  individual  to display  the state  motto on
private property).The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?
But,  as  the  peyote  case  emphasized,  religious  exercises  involve  not
only  words  but  "the  performance  of  (or  abstention  from)  physical
acts.  . . . 9  Some of those acts, however,  may fairly be characterized  as
symbolic  speech.  As  a  general  matter,  an  expressive  activity  is
symbolic  speech  when  it  is  intended  to communicate  and  when,  as  a
matter  of  social  reality,  it  is  generally  understood  by  some  relevant
audience  as  a  communication.  Many  forms  of  ritual  activity  are
symbolic speech.  So, for example, a class studying the Bible is engaged
in  pure  speech,  while  a congregation  receiving  communion  is engaged
in  symbolic  speech.20   The  act  of  communion  is  intended  as  a
communication  by  the congregants  to each  other and,  more  importantly,
to their God,21 and non-congregants  in  our society generally  understand
the act of communion as  a communication of some sort.
Unfortunately,  the  general  status  of  symbolic  speech  in  the  inside-
outside  model  is  confused.  I suspect  that  most  commentators  believe
that  an expressive  activity  intended and  understood  as  a communication
should  be  given  full  protection.  If  so,  ritual  activities  fitting  that
description would be fully protected.22  The  Supreme Court's position is
somewhat  more  complex.  An  expressive  activity  characterized  as
symbolic  speech  can  be directly  regulated if the  state's justification  for
the  regulation  is "unrelated  to the suppression of free expression . ".."23
That  is,  direct regulation  is permissible  when the government  has  some
reason,  independent  of  the  act's  expressive  content,  to  regulate.
Commentators  take  issue  with  the  Court's  approach  because  it  seems
unlikely that the government would enact or enforce  a direct regulation
of an  activity  intended  and  understood  as  a  communication  unless  it
were concerned  with the communicative content of the activity.
19.  Smith, 494 U.S.  at 877.
20.  The example  is  adapted  from  Widmar v.  Vincent,  454  U.S.  263,  286  (1981)  (White, J.,
dissenting).
21.  1 acknowledge  the awkwardness of the  fit between  this description  and the congregation's
deepest  understanding  of  what  is  occurring;  to  say  that  an  act  of  communion  is  intended  to
communicate  to  God  is,  in  some  ways,  to  demean  the  act.  In  addition,  some  sorts of religious
observance  are  not  understood  by  the  religion's  adherents  as  communication  at  all.  This  is
particularly  true of some  Native American  religions.  For a discussion of some  Native  American
religious  observances  with  no  communicative  function,  see  David  C.  Williams  &  Susan  H.
Williams,  Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76  CORNELL  L.  REV.  769  (1991).  And,  from  a
different  direction,  perhaps  the  Constitution's  identification  of religion  as  a  matter of special
concern,  in the Free Exercise  Clause, makes it  easier for  the law to appreciate  that rituals directed
at a worshiper's god should be understood as speech protected by the  Free Speech Clause.
22.  See infra notes 25-26 and  accompanying  text (discussing  some  complications  that arise
when  a ritual activity is intended as a communication  but not understood as such).
23.  United States v. O'Brien,  391  U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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The Court's  development  of the  inside-outside  model  confirms  this
insight.  Suppose  an  expressive  activity,  whether  a religious  ritual  or
otherwise,  lies  outside  the  scope  of  the  Free  Speech  Clause.  It  is
somewhat  misleading  to  say that  the  activity  receives  no protection  at
all;  the government's  regulation  must  still  be rational.  But,  the Court
has  said, there is  an additional  requirement  where the regulated  activity
is  expressive.  The government  may  not discriminate  against particular
viewpoints  expressed  in  acts,  including  speech,  that  are  outside  the
coverage of the First Amendment in the inside-outside model.24
Similar results  occur  with  respect  to religious  rituals  to  the  extent
they  can be described  as symbolic  speech.  The Court in the peyote case
made  this  point  while  invoking  what  it  described  as  the  residual
protection  afforded  by  the  Free  Exercise  Clause:  A  state  could  not
prohibit  particular  physical  acts  "only  when  they  are  engaged  in  for
religious  reasons,  or  only  because  of the  religious  belief  that  they
display." 2 5  The  Court  applied  this  rule  in  finding  unconstitutional  a
city's  ban  on  the  ritual  slaughter  of  animals  performed  as  part  of
Santerfa  religious  worship.26   The  Free  Speech  Clause's  ban  on
viewpoint  discrimination  produces  the  same  result.27   Much  religious
ritual  would  thus  be  protected  as  speech,  whether  pure  or  symbolic,
because  governments  are  unlikely  to  enforce  regulations  against
religious  activities  intended  and  understood  as  communications  for
reasons other than the activities'  communicative  content.
Some  activities  motivated  by  religious  belief,  including  certain
religious rituals,  may not  be fairly described  as  symbolic  speech.  This
may  be because  the  activities,  while  motivated by  religious  belief and
intended  to  communicate  that  belief  (whether  to  God,  to  other
congregants,  or to the wider community),  are  not generally  understood
to  be  communications.  Ordinarily  this  occurs  when  the  activity's
communicative  message  is ambiguous  to those not already cognizant  of
the  intended  message.  The  peyote  case  may  be  an  example:  Those
outside  the  religious  community  may  believe  that  the  non-religious
benefits  of the  use  of a psychoactive  drug  are  large enough  to induce
24.  See  R.A.V.  v.  City  of St.  Paul,  505  U.S.  377  (1992)  (holding  that  although  "fighting
words"  are generally  not protected  under the  First Amendment,  a  state  may not impose content-
based prohibitions on some "fighting  words").
25.  Employment Div.,  Dep't of Human Res. v.  Smith, 494 U.S.  872, 877 (1990).
26.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu  Aye, Inc. v.  City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
27.  Of course,  a club that slaughtered  animals simply for the pleasure of it would be unable  to
invoke  the Free Speech Clause.  But  an anti-vegetarian  club that slaughtered  animals to express
its members  views could  do  so, and could  invoke  the ban on  viewpoint discrimination  were  the
state to ban only the club's  acts of animal slaughter.
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people  to  engage  in  the  ritual  activity because  they  want to obtain  the
non-religious  benefits.28   Similarly,  religiously  motivated  provision  of
sanctuary  to  refugees  may  be  understood  as  a  political  rather  than  a
religious  act,  and  religiously  motivated  objections  to  autopsies  may
seem simply irrational.
Other religiously  motivated  actions are  not even  plausibly  described
as  symbolic  speech.  Here,  the best  examples  are cases  involving  the
application  of local  zoning  ordinances  or historic  preservation  rules  to
church  structures.  Perhaps  a religion  requires  that a church be located
somewhere  in  a  neighborhood.  The  claim  that  the  congregation's
religious  beliefs  require  that  the  church  not  provide  parking  spaces
commensurate  with  local  zoning  requirements  is  implausible.  The
refusal to provide  sufficient  parking spaces  is unlikely  to be  intended  as
a  communication,  and  it  is  certainly  unlikely  to  be  understood  as  a
communication.
Religiously  motivated  actions  that cannot  be described  as  symbolic
speech can be  regulated if the government  has a valid reason,  unless the
reason  arises  from the religious  content of the action.  The same  is true
if the  religiously  motivated  action  is  fairly  characterized  as  symbolic
speech and one accepts the Supreme Court's  approach to the analysis  of
symbolic  speech.  Enforceable  laws  that  directly  regulate  religious
activities,  whether  speech  activities  or  other  religiously  motivated
activities,  are neutral  laws  of  general  applicability.  Their  neutrality
follows  from  the  requirement  that,  even  outside  the  Free  Speech
Clause's  coverage,  governments  may  not discriminate  on  the  basis  of
viewpoint.  Their  generality  follows  from  the  requirement  that  the
government  have  some  reason  other  than  the  suppression  of  free
expression  to justify  direct  regulation  of expressive  activities.29   In
short,  the Free  Speech  Clause  provides  at  least  as  much  protection  to
28.  Cf. United  States  v.  Lee, 455  U.S.  252 (1982)  (rejecting  the claim that a religious believer
can  refuse  to  pay Social  Security  taxes  for his employees).  In  Lee,  Justice  Stevens  noted  that
non-members  of the  religious community  may believe that  the  financial benefits of the asserted
religious belief swamp the  religious ones.  Id. at 264 n.3 (Stevens,  J., concurring).
29.  One  can  read  the  requirement  of general  applicability  to  provide  somewhat  greater
protection for religious liberty.  Consider a statute that regulates  some  activity but contains  some
exemptions, whether expressly or in its administration  by granting decision-makers  the discretion
to  exempt  particular individuals or  groups  from  the  regulation.  The  statute  would  not  target
religious activity in  a discriminatory  way if  the exemptions were  provided only to  non-religious
activities, but  were denied to  some non-religious activities as well as  to religious ones.  My view
is  that this interpretation of the "general  applicability"  standard,  while legally  tenable,  is one  of
those aggressive  readings  motivated  by discomfort  with the basic  rule  laid down  by  the  peyote
case.
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religious activities as the current incarnation of the Free Exercise Clause
does.
I can now  introduce  the second model  of free expression  law.  While
the  inside-outside  model  sharply  distinguishes  between  activities  that
fall within the  protection  of the Free  Speech  Clause and  those that  fall
outside it,30  the  alternative  model is  more  like  an  onion,  with different
layers  in  which  different  types of speech  receive  differing  degrees  of
protection.  This  model  emerged  as  the  Court  became  uncomfortable
with  what  it considered  the rigidities  associated with  full  protection  of
speech  inside  the  scope  of  the  First  Amendment  under  the  inside-
outside  model.  The  Court  initially  treated  all  commercial  speech  as
outside  the  First  Amendment's  scope, 31  but  later  found  that  some
commercial  speech  deserved  some  degree  of protection. 32   The  Court
retained  a  lurking  sense  that  not  all commercial  speech  deserved  the
same  high  degree  of protection  afforded  political  speech,  and  began
protecting  commercial  speech  at  a  level  between  fully  protected  and
unprotected speech.33  A  similar  development  occurred  with  respect  to
sexually explicit but non-obscene  speech.  Some of its forms seemed  to
the  Court  to  be  deserving  of some  protection,  but  certainly  not  the
protection  given core  political speech. 3 4   The  Court thus  moved toward
a  model  in  which  protection  came  in  layers:  High-value  speech  was
fully  protected,  intermediate-value  speech  (commercial  speech)
somewhat  less  so,  low-value  speech  (sexually  explicit  non-obscene
30.  This  creates  large  problems  in  the  administration  of  free  speech  law,  because  the
characterization  of  a particular  activity  becomes  crucial.  A  non-libelous  statement  is entitled  to
full protection,  a libelous  one to  none;  a  sexually explicit but non-obscene photograph  is entitled
to  full  protection,  an  obscene  one to  none.  A  similar characterization  problem  can  arise  with
respect to religious activities,  when the activity may be  widely, but not universally, understood  as
a  communication.  An  example  may  be  the  wearing  of religious  head-gear.  Goldman  v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S.  503  (1986).  The Court's  solution to the problem  in  the  free speech  area
has been  to  insist  on  clear statutory  definitions  of the  matter sought  to  be  regulated,  typically
through  the  use  of the  overbreadth  doctrine.  As  far  as  I  know,  no  similar  development  has
occurred  in the  free exercise  area.  Perhaps  a reconceptualization  of free exercise  as free speech
might have the benefit of producing  sustained attention to the problems of overbreadth  associated
with  religious activities.  There  is  a glimpse of the problem in Justice  Blackmun's dissent  in the
peyote  case, which noted  that consumption of peyote  is not as attractive  as outsiders might think.
Smith,  494 U.S.  at 914 n.7  (Blackmun,  J., dissenting).  Free exercise  law  before  the peyote case
incorporated  a balancing  test,  which is  inimical  to robust development of overbreadth  concepts.
Once the  problems  migrate to the  free  speech  context, perhaps  the overbreadth  problems  can  be
directly confronted.
31.  See Valentine v.  Chrestensen, 316  U.S.  52, 54(1942).
32.  Va.  State  Bd.  of Pharmacy  v.  Va.  Citizens  Consumer Council,  Inc.,  425  U.S.  748,  770
(1976).
33.  See id.
34.  See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.  50 (1976).
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speech)  even  less  so,  and  really  low-value  speech  almost  entirely
unprotected.35  At  each  layer,  state  regulatory  interests  increase  in
importance.  Thus,  an  interest  insufficient  to justify  regulation  of high-
value speech may justify the regulation of intermediate-value  speech.
This  onion  model  creates  what  have  been  called  subject-matter
classifications  of  speech,  distinguished  from  content-based  and
viewpoint-based classifications. 36  The degree  of scrutiny  a  regulation
receives depends  on the subject-matter  regulated.  The key  question for
this  Article then  becomes: Which  layer includes  religious expression?  I
believe  the Court  has  not  addressed  this  question  largely  because  the
Free Exercise  Clause provided  an alternative  source of protection before
the  peyote case.  My intuition,  though,  is that  religious  speech  would  be
given the  protection  afforded speech  either in the highest-value  category
or in the intermediate-value  category.
Some of the reasons  that political  speech  has high-value  also apply to
religious  speech  as  well.  For  example,  governments  have historically
targeted  religious  speech  for  suppression  just  as  they  have  targeted
dissident  political speech.  Additionally,  religious  speech  is,  for  many,
at least  as central to  their self-definition  as political  speech.  Yet, some
of  the  reasons  that  political  speech  has  high-value  apply  much  less
strongly  to religious  speech.  In  particular,  religious  speech  does  not
serve  as  a direct check  on  the political  power of rulers  in the  way that
political  speech  does.37  The  differences  between  political  speech  and
religious  speech  suggest  that  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  may  provide  a
reason  independent of free  speech theory  for treating  religious speech  as
possessing high-value  in the free speech doctrinal framework.
My intuition  is that religious  speech ought  to receive  at least  as much
protection  as  commercial  speech.  The  implications  of that intuition  lie
largely  beyond  this  Article's  scope.  Clearly,  the conclusions  drawn  in
the  analysis  of direct  regulation  under  the inside-outside  model  would
remain  valid  were  religious  speech  treated  as  high-value  speech.  The
analysis of intermediate-value  speech  differs only to the extent that state
35.  This  model  may  itself be undergoing  some  development,  as  the  Court  has  increased  the
protection  given commercial  speech,  perhaps to the point where it receives  full protection.  See 44
Liquormart,  Inc.  v. Rhode Island, 517  U.S. 484 (1996)  (holding that a  state  may not entirely ban
the advertisement of liquor prices consistent  with the First Amendment).
36.  See Geoffrey  R.  Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case
of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46  U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  81,  81-83  (1978)  (arguing  that  speech
restrictions  based  on  "subject-matter"  comprise  a  distinct  classification  of restrictions  for  the
purposes of First Amendment  analysis).
37.  Religious  speech  may  contribute  indirectly  to checking  government  power  by  helping
constitute important civil society institutions.
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regulatory  interests  can  more  frequently  outweigh  the  free  speech
interest when intermediate-value  speech is involved.38
B.  Indirect  Regulation of Religious Expression as Speech
Indirect  regulation  occurs  when  the  government  allows  people  to
engage in an activity their religion requires,  but raises  the cost of doing
so  relative  to the costs incurred  by  people engaged in  similar, but non-
religious,  activities.  The  core  examples  here  are  cases  involving  the
availability  of public  resources-whether  money  or space-to support
activities  that  some  people  are  motivated  to  engage  in  for  religious
reasons  and  that others  are  motivated to  engage  in for  secular reasons.
Some people want to communicate their political views in a public park,
with  an  eye  to persuading  others  to  agree  with  them;  others  want  to
communicate  their  religious  views  in the  same  place,  with  the  same
goal.  Some  people want  to provide  food and  shelter  to the  needy  and
homeless  based  on  secular  accounts  of justice;  others  want  to  do  so
because  of  their  religious  beliefs.  Some  people  want  to  provide
education  outside  the  public  schools  because  they  believe  that  public
schools  are ineffective;  others  want to  do  so because  they  believe  that
public  schools improperly  exclude  religion.  The government indirectly
regulates  religious  activities  when  it  makes  the  park  available  to  the
political proselytizer, but  not the religious one,  when  it provides  funds
for  the  secular  soup  kitchen,  but  not  the  religious  one,  and  when  it
creates  a  voucher  program  in  which  vouchers  can  be  used  only  at
private  schools not affiliated with religious  institutions.  When does  the
Free Speech  Clause  prohibit indirect  regulation  of religious  expression
in these ways?
Indirect regulation  of religious expression  takes two forms.  First, the
government  may  single  out  religious  expression  for  exclusion  from
access  to  the  public  resource  at  issue.  Alternatively,  religious
expression may  fall within  a larger category  of activities that are denied
access  to the resource. 39  According  to the Supreme Court, singling  out
religious  expression  for  indirect  regulation  requires  quite  strong
justifications  because  it  amounts  to  discrimination  on  the  basis  of
38.  Those interests  vary  so  greatly,  and the  balancing  that occurs  when  such  variations  are
introduced  can  be  so  complex,  that  I  find  it unhelpful  to  attempt  even  to sketch  the  possible
outcomes were religious speech treated as intermediate-value  speech.
39.  In  the  latter situation,  the  regulation  may  simply  have  an  adverse  impact  on  specific
religious  activities, or it may  have  a  disparate  impact on  such  activities  when  individuals with
religious  motivations  are  more  likely than  others to  engage  in the  activities falling  within  the
category.
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viewpoint.4°  As in  the case of direct regulation,  much religious activity
can be described  as expressive when indirect regulation  is involved a .4
The  conclusion  that  religious  speakers  cannot  be  excluded  from
access  to  public  resources  devoted  to  speaking  seems  straightforward
enough.  The reason  supporting  that conclusion  is important.  Typically
the government's  asserted justifications for excluding  religious speakers
range from a desire not to  support religion  even  indirectly,  to  a concern
that  the  government  might  be violating  the  Establishment  Clause  by
making  public  resources  available  to  religious  speakers,  or,  more
loosely,  to  a  concern  that  the  government  should  not  do  something
conveying  the  appearance  of  support  for  religion  or  for  specific
religions.  That  is, the justification for excluding  religious  speakers  from
access  to the  public  resource  at  issue typically  relates to  the religious
content of what the  speakers  have  to say.  However,  as we  have  seen,
direct  regulation  of  expressive  activities  is  permitted  only  if  the
government's  reason  for  regulation  is  unrelated  to  the  expressive
content  of  the  regulated  activities.  The  rule  barring  a  categorical
exclusion  of  religious  expression  from  access  to  public  resources
parallels the rule against direct regulation of expressive  activities.
Consider  next the exclusion,  not of religious  expression, but  of some
activities motivated  by religious  belief from access  to public  resources.
Some systems  of public  assistance  to the  needy  make  it  impossible  to
provide  such  services  in  religious  settings,  that is,  in  settings  where  the
service-providers  make  clear their religious  commitments. 4 2   What  are
the justifications for excluding  such providers from the program?  Some
of  the justifications  mirror  those  listed  above;  they  are justifications
related  to  the  religious  content  of  what  is  available-the  religious
symbols  and  statements  that  those  who  receive  assistance  cannot
avoid-and  where  the  service  is  to  be  provided.  To  that  extent,  I
40.  See Rosenberger  v. Rectors  & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,  515 U.S.  819,  835 (1995)  (holding
that  a university  regulation  prohibiting  use  of university  funds  to  support  student  religious
organizations was a form of viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment).
41.  See supra notes  19-23  and  accompanying  text (discussing  when  symbolic  speech  is an
expressive activity).
42.  Obviously,  exclusion would  be  constitutional  if  inclusion  violated  the  Establishment
Clause.  The  Free  Speech Clause  cannot require  what  the Establishment  Clause prohibits.  The
scope of the  Establishment Clause  is, of course,  an  enormous topic in  itself. All  that needs  to be
said here, I think, is that the presence of a free exercise interest in addition to,  or instead  of, a free
speech  interest, cannot  change  the conclusion  that  one  constitutional provision cannot  require
what another prohibits.  I qualify this point below.  See infra notes  87-89  and accompanying text
(arguing that  some legislative accommodations  to religion may  be acceptable because of the Free
Exercise Clause but would, perhaps,  be unacceptable under the Establishment Clause alone).
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believe,  the exclusion of religiously  motivated  providers  from access  to
the programs  is questionable.
Another  set of justifications  is  based  on  the  free  speech  interests  of
the recipients  of  the provided  service.  Recall  that coerced  expression,
religious  or not,  is  banned by  the Free  Speech  Clause.43  The  general
concern  with  providing  certain  religious  organizations  engaged  in
public  assistance with  access to public resources,  is that recipients of the
assistance  will be  coerced  into participating  in religious  exercises.  The
coercion  might  be  blatant,  as  when  a  service  provider  requires  a
recipient  to  attend  a religious ceremony  as  a condition of receiving  the
service, or it might  be subtle,  as when  religious  symbolism  suffuses the
location  in  a  way  that  makes  it  seem  natural  for the recipient  to move
from  the  soup  kitchen  to the  sanctuary.  Under current  understandings
of the  Free Speech Clause, exclusion  of religious  activities  from access
to public  resources  for these reasons  would probably  be  constitutional,
either  because  the justifications  for  exclusion  should  be described  as
unrelated  to  suppression  of expression  or,  more plausibly  in  my  view,
because  the free  speech  interests  of recipients  outweigh  the free speech
interests  of the service providers.
44
One  might  think  that the Free  Exercise  Clause added  something  here
to  the constitutional  protection  of religious  expression  and  activity.  I
have  described  the  problem  of potential  coercion  as  one  in  which  free
speech  interests  are pitted against other free  speech interests.  Where the
free  speech interest  on one  side of the balance  is an interest  in religious
speech,  a Free  Exercise  Clause  independent of the Free  Speech  Clause
might  add  weight  to  that  side.  Unfortunately,  as  the coerced  speech
cases  show,  there appears  to be  a free  exercise  interest  on both sides  of
the balance.  The recipient's  interest  in avoiding coerced  speech  is  also
an  interest  in  religious  speech,  because  the  free  exercise  principle
protects the liberty of non-believers and believers equally.
The final problem to be addressed is indirect  regulation in the form  of
laws  that  have  an  adverse  or  disparate  impact  on  religious  activity.
Modern  free  speech  law  gives  slight  protection  against  such  indirect
regulations.  The  exemplary  case  is  Clark v.  Community for Creative
Non-Violence.45  In Clark, the Court upheld the application  of a general
43.  See supra note  18 and accompanying text (discussing one such coerced speech case).
44.  Alternatively,  perhaps  at least  some systems  in which  the government  puts private  parties
in  a  position  to  coerce  others,  blatantly  or subtly,  into  religious expression  would  violate  the
Establishment  Clause.  See Santa Fe Indep. Sch.  Dist. v.  Doe, 530 U.S.  290 (2000)  (holding that a
school  district's  policy  allowing  student-led  prayer at football  games  violated  the Establishment
Clause).
45.  Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence,  468  U.S. 288 (1984).
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rule  against  camping  in  national  parks  to  prohibit  advocates  for  the
homeless from erecting  a "tent city."  The tent city would have made the
point  that  national  policy  had  deprived  the  tent  city's  residents  of
affordable  shelter.46  Applying  the  regulation  to  the  tent  city  clearly
adversely  affected  the advocates'  ability  to express their  point of view.
This  case  shows  that  mere  adverse  effect  on  expression  does  not
invalidate  otherwise  permissible  regulations.  Nor,  as  the  peyote  case
shows, does  mere  adverse effect on  religious activity  trump permissible
regulations.
47
Older  cases,  which  the Court  appears  to regard as  good  law,  suggest
that  the Free  Speech  Clause  prohibits  some  regulations  that  adversely
affect  speech.48  In  some  of these  cases,  the Court  appears  concerned
that applying  an apparently  neutral regulation will  have a disparate-not
merely  an  adverse-impact  on  some  identifiable  class.  To  use  the
clearest  example,  prohibiting  everyone  from  using  a  city's  parks  or
streets  for  demonstrations  will  have  a  more  serious  impact  on  the
relatively  poor  than  on  the  relatively  well-to-do.  The  latter  can  rent
space for a rally,  or buy time on  television to disseminate  their message;
the  former cannot.  I  find the contours  of the disparate  impact  doctrine
quite  unclear.49   To  the  extent  such  a  doctrine  exists,  it  should  be
adaptable  so that a free speech  disparate impact doctrine  would apply  to
regulations that have a disparate impact on religious expression.
5 0
C.  Conclusion
The  Free Speech  Clause, as currently  interpreted,  provides  protection
for almost all of what the Free Exercise Clause, as currently  interpreted,
does.  There  are  some areas  where the overlap  is incomplete,  where  the
Free  Exercise  Clause  provides  distinctive  protection  even  after  the
46.  Id. at 299.
47.  See Employment  Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S.  872 (1990).
48.  See, e.g.,  Martin  v.  City of Struthers,  319  U.S.  141  (1943)  (holding  that  an  ordinance
prohibiting  individuals  from  knocking  on  doors  to  distribute  literature  violated  the  First
Amendment);  Schneider  v. State,  308  U.S.  147  (1939)  (striking  down  as  violative  of the  First
Amendment  an ordinance prohibiting distribution of literature on public  streets).
49.  Gedicks,  supra note  10,  (arguing  that existing free  speech  doctrine  provides rather robust
protection  when  speech  is  incidentally  burdened  by  facially  neutral regulations).  I  think  that
Gedicks gives more weight  to some of the Court's verbal formulations than  is appropriate  in light
of the way  in  which  the  Court  has  applied  its  tests.  In  my view,  existing doctrine  provides
relatively little  protection  when  non-religious  speech  is incidentally burdened,  and would provide
the same relatively  low level of protection to religious expression.
50.  I am  not  sure  that there  are  any good examples  of such regulations,  or,  if there  are  any,
whether  they are  at  all significant.  If they  are rare or  unimportant,  my  basic point  would stand:
The  Free  Exercise  Clause  adds  little of importance  to  what  is  available  under  the Free  Speech
Clause.
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peyote  case.  Those  areas  are,  however,  rather  small.  Little would  be
lost if the Free  Exercise  Clause, as  currently  interpreted,  were dropped
from  the  Constitution.  As  I argue  next,  some  of what  might  be  lost
could be picked  up again under the emerging doctrine  protecting  a right
of expressive association.
III.  RELIGIOUS PRACTICES  AND THE RIGHT OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
A.  Introduction:  Defending the Ministerial  Exemption
A  state  directive  that  a  church  employ  someone  in  a  ministerial
capacity  who lacks what the church regards  as an essential  qualification
for  the  job  would  seem  to  be  a  quintessential  violation  of  the  Free
Exercise  Clause.  Yet,  the possibility that  the state could do  so without
violating  the Clause opened  up after the peyote  case.51  Many  state laws
ban  discrimination  on  the  basis  of gender  and  marital  status.  Some
denominations  have religious  tenets  according  to  which  only  men,  or
married people,  can  serve as ministers.  As far  as I am  aware,  no state's
anti-discrimination  law  has  been  interpreted  to  proscribe  those
employment  practices,  with  legislatures  creating  exemptions  for
churches  or  courts  construing  the  anti-discrimination  statutes  as  not
reaching  the  practices  in  question.52   The  peyote  case,  however,
suggests  that  states could apply  their  anti-discrimination  laws  to  the
employment  practices  of churches  without  violating  the  Free  Exercise
Clause  because  such  laws  seem  to  be  neutral  laws  of  general
applicability.53   However,  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  is  not  the  only
constitutional  provision  available  to  churches  defending  their
employment practices.
51.  See Smith, 494 U.S. at  872.
52.  In the  federal context, Title VII exempts  "a  religious corporation, association,  educational
institution,  or society  with respect  to  the  employment  of individuals of  a particular  religion  to
perform  work  connected  with  the  carrying  on  by  such  corporation,  association,  educational
institution, or society of its  activities."  Civil Rights Act of 1964,  42 U.S.C.  § 2000e-l(a)  (1994).
Also,  "it  shall  not be  an unlawful  employment  practice  for a school,  college, or other educational
institution..,  to  hire and employ  employees of a particular religion  if...  the curriculum of such
school,  college, university,  or other educational  institution ...  is directed toward  the propagation
of a  particular  religion."  Id.  §  2000e-2(e)(2).  Title  VII  also exempts  hirings, dismissals,  or
classifications  based  on  religion  where  "religion  ...  is  a  bona  fide  occupational  qualification
reasonably  necessary  to the  natural  operation  of that  particular  business  or enterprise."  Id. §
2000e-2(e)(1).
53.  See  Jack  M.  Battaglia,  Religion, Sexual  Orientation, and  Self-Realization:  First
Amendment  Principles  and Anti-Discrimination  Laws, 76 U.  DET. MERCY  L.  REV.  189,  376-77
(1999)  (asserting that "[iut  is questionable"  whether the constitutional  requirement of a ministerial
exemption  survives the peyote case); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
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A  series  of cases  culminating  in  Boy  Scouts of America v.  Dale 54
recognizes  a constitutionally  protected right of expressive  association.55
Dale clarified  the  contours  of  that  right.  First,  the  right  protects
associations  that  "engage  in  some  form  of expression,  whether  it  be
public  or  private." 56   The  Boy  Scouts  qualified  under  this  standard
because  the organization  sought  "to  transmit ...  a system  of values." 57
Second, the courts  must "defer[]  to an association's  assertions regarding
the nature of its expression." 58  That  is,  the values  an association  seeks
to transmit simply are what  the association  asserts  them to be.  Courts
should  not  examine  the  values,  or the  views  expressed,  to  determine
whether  they are  "internally  inconsistent"  or otherwise  problematic,  as
long  as  they  are  sincerely  held.59   Third,  the  right  of  expressive
association  is  impaired  if the  government's  requirement  "affects  in  a
significant  way  the  group's  ability  to  advocate  public  or  private
viewpoints. ' 6°  Finally, just as  the courts must defer  to  an association's
statements  about  its  own  views,  they  must  also  defer  "to  an
association's  view of what would impair its expression."61  In particular,
some  entities  entitled  to  the  protection  of  the  right  of  expressive
association  are  protected  against  "[t]he  forced inclusion  of an  unwanted
person"  because  such  inclusion  would  "force  the  association  to  send a
message  ...  to  the world"  that  is  inconsistent  with  the  organization's
own message.
62
The precise  scope of the right of expressive association  remains to be
determined.  At a minimum, it provides  a constitutional  basis, other than
the  Free  Exercise  Clause,  for exempting  church  employees  from  the
coverage  of state  anti-discrimination  laws.  Churches  plainly  engage  in
public  and private  expression,  and  seek  to transmit  a  set of values.  A
church  that claims  its  message  would  be  impaired  by  complying  with
non-discrimination  laws  is claiming,  for  example,  that  the inclusion  of
54.  Boy Scouts of Am.  v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
55.  See  New  York State  Club  Ass'n,  Inc.  v. City  of New  York, 487  U.S.  1 (1988);  Bd.  of
Directors of Rotary Int'l v.  Rotary Club of Duarte, 481  U.S.  537 (1987);  Roberts  v. United  States
Jaycees,  468 U.S. 609 (1984).
56.  Dale, 530 U.S.  at 648.
57.  Id. at 650.
58.  Id. at 653.
59.  Id. at 651.
60.  Id. at 648.
61.  Id. at 653.  Assertions to that effect appear  to be insufficient standing alone; apparently the
courts  must  be satisfied  that the  association's claim of impairment  is at  least reasonable in  some
minimal sense.
62.  Id. at 648, 653.
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women in the ministry  would  send  a message  to  the world  inconsistent
with the church's own values.
The  ministerial  exemption  is  easy  to  sustain  under  the  right  of
expressive  association.  So  are  somewhat  broader  applications  of
church-based  employment  exemptions.  Michael  McConnell  suggests
that a  limited  reading of the  right of expressive  association  might  not
provide  full  protection  to  church-related  employment  decisions:  "A
church  or synagogue  [should]  not need to demonstrate  that employment
of  any  particular  person  would  be  inconsistent  with  its  expressive
purpose;  the  law respects  the  fundamental  autonomy  of religion  with
respect  to all employment  in  a religious  capacity." 63   Dale's emphasis
on judicial deference  to an institution's characterization  of its expressive
activities  means  that  churches  would  not  have  to  demonstrate
inconsistency,  but  merely  assert it,  to obtain  the protection  McConnell
thinks  desirable.  More  interesting  and  difficult  cases  arise  from  two
components  of  the  Supreme  Court's  doctrine.  One  is  the  test  for
determining  whether an entity has a right of expressive  association;  the
other is the test for determining  when  such  an entity is  forced  to  send a
message incompatible  with its own.
B.  Identifying Entities Covered by the Right of Expressive  Association
As the Court stated  in Dale, to be covered by  the right of expressive
association,  the  entity  "must  engage  in  some  form  of  expression,
whether  it  be  public  or private." 64  Consider  an  ordinary  commercial
enterprise  owned  by  a  group of devoutly  religious  friends,  who  place
expressions  of  their  religious  beliefs  throughout  their  place  of
business.65  One can readily  imagine  a charge that  the pervasiveness  of
those expressions  constitutes  harassment of employees  on  the basis  of
religion,66 or that  the displays  discriminate  against  potential  customers
63.  McConnell, supra note 3,  at 20.
64.  Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 (emphasis  added).
65.  I use the example  of a business  owned  by  a group of people for expository  purposes,  to
avoid being  distracted  by questions  that might arise  were  the business  to be owned  by  a single
person,  whose right  of association might be thought not  to be implicated  in regulations limiting
the display of religious  materials  in  the business-place.  I  believe  that  an  individual  owner does
have a  right  of expressive association,  for reasons  I  discuss  below,  see infra notes  71-81  and
accompanying  text,  but think  it  better  to discuss  the  coverage  of commercial  entities  before  I
discuss  the coverage of intimate ones.
66.  For  examples,  see  Eugene  Volokh,  What Speech  Does  "Hostile Work  Environment"
Harassment Law  Restrict?, 85  GEO.  L.J.  627,  630-33  (1997).  Such  examples  of harassment
include an employer  placing  religious  articles  in  the employee  newsletter  and Christian-themed
verses on the paychecks;  another employer allowed  daily  broadcasting of prayers over the public
address system.  Id.
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who adhere  to other religions  or to no religion  at all.  Would the owners
be protected by the right of expressive association against such charges?
It is  tempting to  think that the right of expressive  association  extends
only  to  entities  organized  for  the  purpose  of expression,  or  perhaps
more  broadly  to  entities  that  engage  primarily  in  expression.  That
would be sufficient  to cover churches  as  institutions,67 but would leave
religious  believers  acting  through  other  types  of  organizations
unprotected.  Dale shows,  however,  that entities  entitled  to claim  the
protection  of  the  right  of  expressive  association  need  not  devote
themselves  entirely  to expression  or even  to the  transmission of values.
The Boy Scouts  engage  in many activities  other  than  expression or the
transmission  of values,  including  some  commercial  activities.  As  the
Court  said,  "associations  do  not have  to associate  for  the  'purpose'  of
disseminating  a  certain  message"  to  be  protected  by  the  right  of
expressive  association.68   Richard  Epstein  has  pointed  out  that  nearly
every  commercial  entity  has  a  "corporate  culture"  that  serves  as  the
entity's  expression  of  its  basic  commitments.69   As  Epstein  puts  it,
"every organization  engages in  expressive activity  when it projects  itself
to its own members  and to the rest of the world."'70  Under that analysis,
Dale might provide constitutional protection  to all associations.
Extending the right of expressive association  to ordinary  commercial
enterprises  owned  and  operated  by  people  with  deeply  held  beliefs,
religious  or  political,  might  be  quite  troubling.  The owner  of Ollie's
Barbeque  may  have  had  political  or  moral  objections  to  serving
African-Americans  in  the restaurant  he owned.7'  Lester Maddox,  who
became  governor  of  Georgia,  came  to  public  attention  when  he
vehemently  objected  to  "associating"  with  African-Americans  by
67.  David  E.  Bernstein, Antidiscrimination  Laws and the First  Amendment,  66  MO.  L.  REV.
83  (2001).  The  article  concludes  that  Dale would  protect  religious  schools  that  discharge
"employees  who become pregnant out  of wedlock if  sex outside  of marriage  is frowned upon  by
the  sponsoring  church,"  and  that  "[c]hurches  that  teach that  mothers  should  stay  at  home  with
young children may...  refuse to employ women  with young children."  Id. at  130-31.  I wonder
whether  a religious  school  that predicates  its action  on  concern  for "sex  outside of marriage"
could thereby justify discharging  only unmarried  pregnant  women,  and  not  men  who engage  in
non-marital  sexual  relations.  Of course,  the  school  could  reformulate  its  religiously  based
concern  so  as  to  deal  only with  "sex  outside  of marriage  by  women,"  and  under  Dale that
reformulation would  receive deference.
68.  Dale, 530 U.S.  at 655.
69.  Richard  A. Epstein, The  Constitutional  Perils of Moderation: The  Case of the Boy Scouts,
74 S. CAL.  L. REV.  119,  139-40 (2000).
70.  Id. at  140.
71.  See  Katzenbach  v.  McClung,  379  U.S.  294  (1964)  (rejecting  claim  based  upon  the
Commerce Clause that the  1964 Civil Rights Act could not be applied to Ollie's Barbeque).
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providing  them  with  service  at  his  restaurant.72  Thus,  the  right  of
expressive  association  might  threaten  the  enforcement  of  anti-
discrimination  laws  where  purely commercial  entities owned  by people
with strong convictions claim to be entitled to the right's protection.
The  Court's  language  in Dale-"must engage  in  some  form  of
expression"-tends  to  support  a  broad  application  of  the  right  of
expressive  association.  The  very act  of discriminating,  one  might say,
is expression  sufficient  to bring the right of expressive  association  into
play.73   Alternatively,  one  might  analogize  the  association  forced  by
anti-discrimination  laws  to  coerced  expression  in  the  free  speech
context.  Perhaps,  at  best,  it  can  be  said  that  a  line  must  be  drawn
somewhere,  noting  only  that  size,  the amount of expression  relative  to
the amount of commercial  activity,  and the degree  to which  an entity is
under  the  personal  supervision  of  individuals  who  espouse  particular
views will  affect the line-drawing  exercise.  That is,  the larger and more
fully  commercial  the  enterprise,  the  less  likely  a  successful  right  of
expressive association  claim will be.74
If large  commercial enterprises pose  one problem for efforts to define
the  coverage  of  the  right of expressive  association,  extremely  small
enterprises  pose  another.  Here,  the  model  is  the  individual  landlord
renting  a  room,  or the  half  of a  duplex  in  which  he  or  she  does  not
reside,  to  tenants.  The  landlord  may  have  religious  objections  to
cohabitation  by non-married  people, and want to refuse  to rent the room
to  a  cohabiting  couple.  Enforcing  an  ordinance  prohibiting
discrimination  on  the  basis  of  marital  status  might  indeed  force
72.  Ian  Ayres,  Alternative Grounds: Epstein's Discrimination  Analysis  in  Other Market
Settings, 31  SAN DIEGO L. REV.  67, 72 (1994)  (citing Maddox's obituary  to support  the assertion
that "Lester  Maddox  gained  national publicity shortly after  passage of the  1964 Civil Rights Act
when  he  distributed  ax  handles  to  supporters  in order  to  prevent blacks  from  patronizing  his
Atlanta restaurant,  the Pickrick").
73.  Analogous  arguments have  been  made  in  connection  with  claims that  these  expressions
are protected  by  the Free  Speech clause directly.  The literature  is extensive.  See, e.g.,  Deborah
Epstein,  Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equality in the Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of
Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84  GEO.  L.J. 399  (1996);  Eugene  Volokh, Comment,
Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment,  39 UCLA  L.  REV.  1791  (1992).  I suspect  that
supplementing the  free speech arguments with  an  argument drawing upon  the right of expressive
association will not change anyone's position on where  the line should be drawn.
74.  Bernstein, supra note 67,  at 215-17.  Bernstein  relies on  the fact  that Justice Sandra  Day
O'Connor  voted  with  the  majority  in Dale and  previously  stated  that the  right of expressive
association extended only to associations that were primarily  expressive to support his conclusion
that the right extends  only to non-profit associations.  Id. at  127.  According to Bernstein,  "[iut  is
difficult  to  see  how  a for-profit  entity  would  successfully  argue  that  it exists  primarily  for
expressive  purposes."  Id.  I  note  that  this  limitation  seems  in  some  tension  with Dale's
apparently broader formulation.
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something  reasonably called association on the unwilling  landlord.  Yet,
as  Herbert  Wechsler  notoriously  pointed  out,  the  government  forces
association  on unwilling people all the  time.75  The landlord's case may
differ from the general  case of forced association for two reasons.  First,
the  setting  seems  more  intimate,  more  directly  tied  to  the  landlord's
definition  of his or her  own  identity,  than in the  general case  of forced
association  through  anti-discrimination  laws. 76   The  landlord,  that  is,
may  be  able  to  assert  a  right  to  intimate  association  as  the  basis  for
finding  unconstitutional  this  particular  type  of "forced  association."
Second,  society  may  be  more willing  to  accept  as  sincere  those claims
based  on  the idea  that  association  in  relatively  small-scale  interactions
would  send  a message  to the  world  inconsistent  with the messages  the
objector  wishes  to  send.  In  this  way  the  claim  of forced  association
takes  on  a  specific  expressive  component.  My  intuition  is  that  a
landlord,  physically  present near  the  leased premises,  should  be able  to
claim protection under the right of expressive association.
C.  Identifying Impermissibly Coerced Messages
The  second  problem  with  the  right  of expressive  association  that
deserves  attention,  is  the  Court's  conclusion  in Dale that  the  right  is
violated  when  a statute  has the effect of requiring  an  entity covered  by
the  right  of expressive  association  to  "send  a  message  to  the  world"
inconsistent  with  the  entity's  own  beliefs. 77  In Dale,  enforcing  the
state's  anti-discrimination  laws  would  not  require  the  Boy  Scouts
actually  to send a literal  message.  Rather,  as  the Court put  it, "Dale's
presence"  sends the  message.78  Action,  not words,  sends  the  message
that conflicts with the Boy Scouts'  own message.
A wide range  of actions  might  send a message  that violates  the  right
of expressive  association.  Consider  the idea  of scandal as it occurs  in
75.  Herbert  Wechsler,  Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,  73  HARV.  L. REV.  1
(1959)  (stating  "the  freedom of association  is denied  by segregation"  and  arguing that  the  same
freedom is denied by desegregation  as well).
76.  The jurisdictional  limitation  in federal anti-discrimination  law,  which extends the scope  of
coverage  only  to  non-intimate  settings,  seems  to  confirm  my  sense  that  society  recognizes  a
difference  between  intimate and  non-intimate  settings.  Civil  Rights  Act  of 1964,  42  U.S.C.  §
2000e(b)  (1994)  (defining  an  employer  as  one  "who  has  fifteen  or  more  employees");  Fair
Housing  Act,  42  U.S.C.  §  3603(b)(2)  (1994)  (exempting  from  the  Fair  Housing  Act  of  1968
multifamily  dwellings of fewer than  four units,  if the owner  resides  in one of them).  Of course,
this jurisdictional  limitation  is simply statutory,  and  I am claiming  that the Constitution  requires
some sort  of jurisdictional  limitation,  at  least  when  claims  against  forced  association  rest  on
concerns about expression, whether religious or political.
77.  Boy Scouts of Am.  v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
78.  Id. at 653.
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Roman Catholic moral  teaching.  According to one definition, an  action
may constitute  a  scandal  when  it leads  someone else  to sin or  to think
less of the teaching of the Church.79  The idea of scandal  is simple:  non-
Catholics  will think less of the church  when they  observe a Catholic,  or
a church-related  institution,  engaged  in  actions that  appear inconsistent
with  what  the  observers  believe  to  be  Catholic  doctrine,  because  the
observers  will  think  the  actions  hypocritical.  An  example  of  the
problem would  be whether a doctor  who performs elective sterilizations
in  her private medical  practice  should  be given hospital  privileges  at a
hospital operated under the control of the Catholic Church.
The concept  of scandal  plays a role  in  the complex  body of Catholic
moral teaching  dealing  with cooperation  with evil.  In that teaching,  the
possibility of scandal  is  one element  that  should  be  taken  into  account
when  a  Catholic,  or  a  church-related  institution,  contemplates  a
particular action;  it  is  rarely  dispositive.  That,  however,  is  simply  a
characteristic  of  the  specific  teachings  of  the  Catholic  Church.
Individuals  or  entities protected  by  the right of expressive  association
certainly could  take a broader view  of scandal  than does  Catholic  moral
teaching.80  The previously  discussed landlord, for example,  might have
personal  views  according to which  it would be  scandalous  for people to
know  that he  or  she had  rented  the  duplex  to  a  cohabiting couple.  A
person  or entity  covered  by  the  right  of expressive  association  might
claim  that  complying  with  some  government  directive  would  be
scandalous  in  the  relevant  sense;  it  would  lead  others  to think  less  of
that person  or entity's commitment to its religious  beliefs.  Notably, the
point  of scandal  is that scandalous  acts  interfere  with  the message  the
person  or  entity  is  attempting  to  communicate.  Additionally,  Dale
holds  that the courts  must defer to the claimant's  own  characterization
of  its  religious  beliefs,  which,  I  would  think,  would  have  to  include
beliefs about what constitutes  a scandal.  Through  this route,  a person  or
entity  might  be  able  to  establish  the  claim  that  complying  with
government  regulations  would  violate  the  right  of  expressive
association.
81
79.  BENEDICT M.  ASHLEY,  O.P.,  &  KEVIN  D.  O'ROURKE,  O.P.,  HEALTH  CARE ETHICS:  A
THEOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS  195 (4th ed. 1997).
80.  See Frazee  v. Ill.  Dep't of Employment  Sec., 489  U.S.  829 (1989)  (holding  that the  Free
Exercise  Clause protects a  person with sincere  religious  beliefs even though  the person  was not a
member of an established religious sect or church).
81.  The Court's opinion in  Dale suggests that courts might review  the claim of scandal  to  see
if the claimant sincerely believed  that scandal would result from compliance.  See Dale, 530 U.S.
at 646-47.  Historically  the  courts have  been reluctant to find  that  a  belief assertedly  held  by  a
claimant  is  held insincerely,  and I  suspect that  this  would be true in  the context  of the  right of
expressive association  as well.
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D.  Conclusion
In Dale, for the first time,  the Supreme  Court found that  a state  law
violated the  right of expressive  association.  From the  majority's  point
of view,  the case  may have  been a particularly  strong one for enforcing
that right.  However,  it is important to  note that four justices dissented.
Therefore,  one should be cautious  in  developing robust and far-reaching
doctrines  on  the  basis  of Dale and  its  analytic  structure.  Perhaps,
though, one  should take  the Court at its word.  Dale, as doctrine,  could
support  the development  of constitutional  prohibitions  on  a substantial
range  of state  regulatory  efforts  that  might not  fall  directly  under  the
protection  of  the  Free  Speech  Clause.  If  so,  the  independent
contribution  of the  Free  Exercise  Clause  to  religious  liberty  would  be
further reduced.
IV.  THE RESIDUAL EFFECTS OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The  Free  Exercise Clause  has some  residual content  after Smith, the
peyote case.  First, state  laws are immunized  from  free exercise scrutiny
only  if they  are  neutral  laws  of general. applicability.  As the  Santerfa
case shows,  laws that single out religious  practices for adverse treatment
are  subject  to  careful  constitutional  examination. 82  Yet,  nearly  every
such  law  would  be  subject  to  the  same  degree  of careful  examination
under  the  Free  Speech  Clause.  As  we  have  seen,  a  great  deal  of
religious  activity  is  either  speech  in  its  pristine  form or  can fairly  be
characterized  as  expressive  conduct.  When  the  state  singles  out such
speech  or  expressive  conduct  for regulation,  it  engages  in  viewpoint
discrimination.  After  all,  singling  out  some  activity  for  differential
treatment is just another way for the government  to discriminate  against
that activity.  The  residual  Free Exercise  Clause  might  protect against
laws  singling  out  religious  activities  that  could  not  fairly  be
characterized  as expressive  conduct,  but I  am confident that the number
of instances  in  which  such  protection  is  needed  is  quite  small.  The
activities  that  irritate  people  so  much  that  they  press  their
representatives  to  regulate  only  these  activities  and  not  other  similar
activities are quite likely to be religious speech or expressive  conduct.
The more  interesting residual component  of the Free  Exercise Clause
is the protection  it affords to what have come to be called hybrid claims,
that  is,  claims  in which  a free  exercise  claim that would be insufficient
standing  alone  to  trigger  close  examination  of  the  challenged
government  conduct  is joined  with  some  other  constitutionally  rooted
82.  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,  Inc.  v. City of Hialeah,  508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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claim that would be insufficient standing  alone to do so as well.83  It has
never been  made  clear  how  we  should  understand  the protection  given
hybrid  claims.  A  panel  of the  Court of Appeals  for the  Ninth Circuit
offered  an extensive, and to my  mind exceedingly generous,  analysis  of
the hybrid-claim  issue in a now-vacated  decision.84  The case involved  a
challenge  to the enforcement of a local ordinance  barring discrimination
by  landlords  against  potential  tenants  on  the basis  of their non-marital
status.  The  landlord  had  religious  objections  to  non-marital
cohabitation,  and refused  to rent  an  apartment  to an unmarried  couple
who were, in the landlord's  view, more than mere roommates.
According  to  the  panel,  close  examination  was  justified  when  the
claimant  presented  non-frivolous  arguments  that the activity  sought  to
be regulated  was protected  by  some constitutional  provision  other  than
the  Free  Exercise  Clause, joined  with  a substantial  argument  that  the
regulation  had  a  disparate  adverse  impact  on  those  with  particular
religious beliefs.85  This formulation  would  approximate  the restoration
of the Free  Exercise  Clause to its pre-Smith scope, in  light of the ready
availability  of non-frivolous  arguments  supporting  an  enormous  range
of asserted constitutional  claims.  More  important,  it seems  quite likely
that,  under  today's  law,  the  landlord  has  not  just  a  non-frivolous
constitutional  claim,  but a good one, that insisting  that  he refrain  from
discriminating  against  unmarried  tenants  would  violate  his  right  of
expressive  association.
86
The Free Exercise  Clause might have  a final  and perhaps  unexpected
residual  effect.  Consider permissible  accommodations  of religion,  that
83.  I do  not discuss  the other qualification  the Smith Court  placed  on  its formulation  of free
exercise  doctrine, that  one could  still make  valid free  exercise  claims  in contexts  where the state
already had  in place  a mechanism  for  making  individualized  determinations  relevant  to the free
exercise claims.  See Employment  Div.,  Dep't of Human  Res.  v.  Smith, 494 U.S.  872,  880-81
(1990).  1 know  of no decisions  relying  on  this qualification,  which  in any  event  seems  quite
unjustified on  the facts of Smith and, as far as  I  can tell, every  other free  exercise  case the Court
has decided.  As the Court  analyzed Smith, the question  for decision was  whether the state had  to
adjust  its  criminal  laws  against  drug  use  to  accommodate  those who  used  peyote  in religious
ceremonies.  Id. at 874.  The  criminal enforcement  setting,  however, is  full of opportunities  for
individualized  determinations,  both informal,  as prosecutors  make decisions  about which  cases to
pursue,  and formal,  when juries  could  be asked  whether a particular  defendant presented  a claim
for accommodation  that ought  to be honored.  If the qualification  would  be applicable to Smith
itself, it is hard to see  what content it could have.  See also McConnell,  supra note 3,  at 3 (noting
that  "few  statutes  are  generally  applicable  across the  board,  without  exceptions  and  without
consideration of individual cases").
84.  Thomas  v. Anchorage  Equal  Rights Comm'n,  165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999),  withdrawn  for
reh'g, 192 F.3d  1208 (9th Cir.  1999), vacated en banc, 220 F.3d  1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
85.  Id.
86.  See supra Part III.B  (discussing the scope of the right of expressive association).
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is,  statutes  in  which  the  legislature  itself  adjusts  the  scope  of  its
regulatory  programs  by  exempting some potential  subjects of regulation
by  explicit  reference  to  some  religious  feature  of their  activity  or
composition.  These  accommodations  have  been  challenged  under  the
Establishment  Clause.87   What justifications  for such  accommodations
might  a  legislature  offer,  in  the  absence  of  a  Free  Exercise  Clause?
Without  the Free  Exercise  Clause, the legislature's action  would have to
be  justified  by  some  aspect  of  its  general  police  power.  That  is,  its
explanation  for  its refusal  to extend  regulatory  power  to the full  scope
suggested  by the statutory  definitions  absent  the accommodation  would
have  to refer to its  general  authority  to legislate  in  the public  interest,
including  the  public  interest  in  treating  religious  believers  decently. 88
But  the  general  police power cannot be  a sufficient justification  against
an  otherwise  cogent  anti-establishment  challenge,  because  every  law  is
justified  by  the general  police  power.  To  allow  the  police  power  to
justify  what  would  otherwise  be  violations  of  the  anti-establishment
principle  would  be to  deprive  that principle  of any  content.  The Free
Exercise  Clause,  however,  might  operate  as  a  narrow justification  for
legislative accommodations  of religion.89
The  residual  Free  Exercise  Clause,  then,  may  still  be  inextricably
linked  to the Establishment Clause,  not because,  as  in  the conventional
view,  both  clauses  protect  religious  liberty,  but  because  the  Free
Exercise  Clause is  necessary  to defeat  Establishment  Clause challenges
to a certain class of statutes.
87.  Corp. of Presiding Bishop  of the Church  of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints  v. Amos, 483
U.S.  327  (1987)  (holding  that  the  application  of  a  statutory  exemption  to  a  religious
organization's  secular  activities  did  not violate  the  Establishment Clause;  noting  that sufficient
room exists under  the Clause for benevolent  neutrality  allowing religious exercise to exist  without
sponsorship  and without interference).
88.  In  a non-religious  context,  a government  may  adjust  the  scope  of  its  programs  without
serious  constitutional  limitation.  A  program regulating  agricultural  production,  for example,  may
exempt  peanut farmers.  The exemption  would  be  permissible  if  rationally  supported  by  some
police power  rationale.  Calling the  exemption  an  accommodation  to  peanut  farmers  brings  out
the  parallel  to  religious  accommodations,  and  demonstrates  the  large  extent  to  which  police
power rationales  can support accommodations.
89.  Accommodating  religious  belief might be  more problematic  than  other exemptions  from
regulatory  programs.  Religious  accommodations  discriminate  in favor of a certain  type of belief,
and therefore  against  other types.  Ordinarily  such  discrimination  would have  to survive  a high
degree of review.  See,  e.g.,  Police Dep't of Chi.  v. Mosley,  408  U.S.  92 (1972)  (holding  that the
city ordinance  violated the  Equal  Protection  Clause  by  making  an  impermissible  distinction  in
permitting  peaceful  labor  picketing  and  banning  other peaceful  picketing).  The  Free  Exercise
Clause might lower  the standard for justifying religiously  based accommodations  in the face of an
objection  based  on the  equality component  of the  free speech  doctrine.  (I admit  to being  a bit
uncomfortable  with  this  assertion,  because  I have  a  sense  that  it  attempts  to  make  the  Free
Exercise Clause  do too  much work across disparate constitutional provisions.)
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V.  CONCLUSION
The  Supreme  Court's  peyote  decision  has  been  widely  decried  as
substantially  reducing  the  constitutional  protection  afforded  religious
belief  and  practice. 9 0  Such  criticisms  overlook  the  possibility  that
practices  previously  protected  by  the Free  Exercise  Clause  can  still  be
protected  under  other  constitutional  doctrines. 91   The  free  speech
doctrine  and the newly  defined  right of expressive  association  go a long
way  to providing  an  adequate  substitute  for  the  Free  Exercise  Clause.
What  may  be  lost,  however,  is  a  sense  that  religious  discourse  is
somehow  importantly  different  from  non-religious  discourse  about
politics,  morals,  and the  rest of human  activity.  Whether  we ought to
regret  the  diminution  of that  sense  in  constitutional  law  is,  of course,
another question.
90.  See Battaglia,  supra note  53,  at 376;  Douglas  Laycock,  The  Remnants of Free Exercise,
1990  SUP. CT.  REV.  1; Michael  W.  McConnell,  Free Exercise and the Smith Decision, 57  U.
CHI. L.  REV.  1109  (1990).
91.  I should note  as well that the actual protection  distinctively  afforded by the  Free Exercise
Clause  was  always  smaller  than  the  Clause's  most  vigorous  proponents  asserted.  For  a
discussion, see Mark Tul net, The Rhetoric of  Free Exercise Discourse,  1993 BYU  L.  REV.  117.
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